



Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY

9389/32

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

May/June 2021

1 hour

You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.
 - Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939
 - Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
 - Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [].

This document has **4** pages.

Section A: Topic 1**The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939**

- 1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

For many of those who have written about empire, there has been a missionary purpose. It springs from a deep sense of moral unease about the impact of empire, and often from the belief that the worst ills of our time (racism in particular) can be traced to its influence. It sets out to show that the imperialist mentality was deluded and false and deeply immoral. The limitations of such claims as a depiction of empire, and Britain's in particular, are obvious. The underlying assumption is that all empires are abnormal. No error could be more basic. Empire has been the political norm over much of the world and over most of world history. The conditions that give rise to empire are neither peculiarly modern, nor particularly rooted in European behaviour. This suggests that empires cannot necessarily be seen as the enemies of cultural and material advance among those over whom they ruled. Historians of earlier empires have no problem in conceding that they were often culturally creative and materially beneficial. It seems strange to withhold this more balanced approach from the European empires. It leads to a history in stereotypes, in which the interests of rulers and ruled are seen as stark opposites, without the ambiguity and uncertainty which define most human behaviour. It treats the subjects of empire as passive victims of fate. It imagines the contact between rulers and ruled as a closed bilateral encounter. Most strangely of all, it portrays Britain itself as culturally and politically one-dimensional, obsessed not just with empire but with imposing one version of it: cultural domination, economic exploitation, coercive control.

Such history is a poor guide to the past. We need a history that explains more convincingly how Britain's imperial world was constructed. It will need to do justice to the extraordinary variety of colonial societies. Barbados, Uganda, South Africa, Singapore, New Zealand and India were all British colonies. It would not be easy to argue that their shared experience of empire produced similar outcomes. We also need to acknowledge the diversity of British society. What made the British so adept as empire-builders was, in part, the exceptional range and variety of the interests, skills and activities mobilised by the prospect of expansion abroad – a versatility that denied to British imperialism the ideological coherence and political solidarity on which traditional accounts of 'imperial Britain' are naively based.

Most of all we need an imperial history that pays close attention to the terms and conditions on which British interests and influence entered a particular region in search of trade or dominion. This was almost never possible without some form of local alliance or understanding with the rulers and peoples who claimed or controlled the area concerned. The bases the British first established might be limited by the locals, who had the military means to stop the British from capturing their trade with the peoples and markets inland (for long the case in West Africa, India and China). In this situation, it required a drastic upsetting of this local balance of power before the British could be more than a puny mercantile presence, usually a convenience for local rulers and traders, sometimes a nuisance, but almost never a threat. Sometimes governments in London decided that British control must be real, and provided the force to make this effective. But this rarely occurred as a unilateral or spontaneous decision. The usual scenario was much more complex, because the British were in almost all cases only one element in a much larger equation.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

At the beginning of February 1941, during a meeting of old party comrades, Hitler was asked what he intended to do with the Jews. He replied instinctively, 'Madagascar', but on being reminded that the island was far away, admitted that the project was not achievable. The Jews, he said, could be shipped off, but he was reluctant to risk German vessels to British torpedoes. Now he would need another plan, 'less friendly'.

The next few months were crucial, the interval in which the pieces came together from an inner logic not recognisable even to the perpetrators. Like the invasion of the Soviet Union, which had the quality of an unlimited assault, it was a reckoning. Because of that invasion, it seemed possible and, increasingly, essential. If German men were going to die in the showdown, so would the Jews, those ancient enemies who had survived all the wars and expulsions of the past.

Yet the decision was not a simple one, and it was not written and signed like the euthanasia order or the directive to invade the Soviet Union. There is no particular moment that can be identified as the turning point in the interplay between preparations of scheming functionaries and Hitler's own utterances, but we may conclude that finally he articulated the unmistakable words that even Himmler called frightful. The words were not recorded, but they were alluded or referred to over and over. They were used repeatedly to counter arguments put forward by German and non-German authorities for exemptions or delays. The Final Solution was not avoidable; it was the Führer's will.

Hitler was the supreme architect of the Jewish catastrophe. It is he who transformed the ideas of 1940 into the hard reality of 1941. Hitler made this final step the inevitable outcome of all the anti-Jewish measures taken over the years, and he forged Germany's diverse and decentralised administrative apparatus into a network of organisations acting in unison so that shooting operations, deportations, and gassings could be implemented simultaneously.

The emergence of the Final Solution may be traced to the first days of March 1941, when Hitler amended a draft directive dealing with the treatment of civilians in territories to be occupied in the Soviet Union. He wanted the Jewish-Bolshevist intelligentsia to be eliminated and Bolshevist chieftains and commissars to be 'rendered harmless'. For this purpose, he demanded the deployment of special organs of the SS and police. These organs, known as Einsatzgruppen, were formed by the Security Police just before the invasion and went into action soon after the battle was opened on 22 June. Orders were passed down by word of mouth. After the war, several of the commanders insisted they had been told to kill all the Jews in the path of the advance. The Jews, however, numbered in the millions and the killers were but thousands. To shoot a few commissars, the Einsatzgruppen were too big; for the total annihilation of Soviet Jewry they were, unaided, much too small. What was the meaning of that phrase 'Jewish-Bolshevist intelligentsia'? Did this order comprise all the Jews? In June, July, and August 1941, the shootings were in fact confined to Jewish men and a relative handful of Communists. Yet it was soon clear that dead Jewish men were leaving behind live Jewish women and children who could not fend for themselves. Killing these utterly defenceless dependents was something new, another milestone fraught with a heavy psychological burden. By August and September, this threshold was crossed as well. The evolution of the process was complete and the shootings became routine.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: Topic 3

The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Kennan's Long Telegram was the decisive factor in the Truman administration's change of course to a policy of firmness towards the Soviet Union. When Clark Clifford and George Elsey, a White House aide, were asked by Truman in July 1946 to prepare a detailed analysis of Soviet-American relations, the replies they received from officials were almost all along the lines of the Long Telegram. Clifford's report, passed to the President on 24 September 1946, underlined this remarkable unanimity of views. There was general agreement that the very existence of the Soviet Union threatened the United States. America must therefore speak the language of military might and make the containment of the Soviet threat its primary aim throughout the world. 'Stern policies' should be adopted to protect American interests and those of small nations. Those countries outside the Soviet sphere of influence should be extended economic and political support in their struggle against Soviet penetration. Military support was not ruled out as a last resort, but economic aid, trade agreements, and technical assistance would be a much more effective way of demonstrating the staying power of capitalism. Those who continued to stress the flexibility of the Soviet leaders and the possibility of reaching an agreement with them found their influence dwindling. The most significant of these voices was that of Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce. In a speech in September 1946 he advocated the recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence in eastern and south-eastern Europe, and warned that 'the tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get'. Secretary of State Byrnes threatened resignation if Wallace did not go, and conservatives applied all the pressure they could. In his speech Wallace had gone as far as to claim that the President agreed with him, but the only effect of this was that Truman demanded his resignation. There was no place in the administration now for anyone who had doubts about the new course in foreign policy.

Why did the doctrine of containment spread like wildfire and exert such influence, given that it did not accurately reflect the realities of the time? There are several possible explanations. First, Churchill's opinion that appeasement had prepared the way for Hitler was generally accepted. It was a short step from viewing Nazi Germany as totalitarian and expansionist to seeing the Soviet Union in the same light. The West had deceived itself over Germany; it must not do the same over the Soviet Union. Second, the increase in American power had not, paradoxically, been accompanied by a feeling of security – rather the reverse. The enormous expansion of its influence throughout the world meant that the potential for conflict had also increased. The existence of nuclear weapons forced constant reappraisals of national security. Third, insecurity was increased due to fears of a recession after the war, fuelled by memories of the 1930s. Management and labour were looking for ways of avoiding another depression, and the state of health of the European market economies held out little hope. Fourth, wartime mobilisation had been remarkably successful in expanding output and enriching the United States. What was needed now was a peacetime equivalent which would inspire and motivate the American people. Kennan had provided the necessary rationale. The World War could be replaced by the Cold War, thus allowing the US economy to benefit. Last, the war had given rise to a formidable military establishment in the United States. The end of hostilities threatened its existence. It needed a powerful reason to reassert itself and discovered this in the Soviet threat.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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